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The effects of visual priming on information
processing in child sexual offenders
Kirsten Keown,1 Theresa A. Gannon2* & Tony Ward1
1Victoria University of Wellington, School of Psychology, Wellington, New Zealand, and 2Keynes
College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK
Abstract Child sexual offenders are hypothesized to hold offence-supportive beliefs that set them
apart from others. The current study seeks support for this view via a cognitive-experimental
approach. Child sexual offenders and offender controls were exposed to pictures of semi-clothed children
(priming condition) or clothed, mature adults (control condition). Participants then read ambiguous
sentences describing children’s actions that could be interpreted in a sexualized manner. Next,
participants completed a surprise recognition test in which half the sentences were re-presented in an
unambiguously sexual form, and half in an unambiguously non-sexual form. Contrary to hypotheses,
primed and/or control child sexual offenders did not show a memory bias for sexualized sentences,
suggesting that they did not interpret the original sentences in line with offence-supportive beliefs.
Results raise questions about whether child sexual offenders universally hold abnormal beliefs that
facilitate their offending. Results also highlight the need for further experimental research within this
field.
Keywords Child sexual offenders; child molesters; beliefs; cognitive distortions; priming;
information processing
Introduction
Sexual abusers of children inflict heavy costs upon their victims, their victims’ families and
society as a whole. Why do these individuals pursue sexual activity with minors? Psychologists
have theorized that child sexual offenders (CSOs) hold cognitions that set them apart from
non-abusive individuals. This hypothesis was first posited by Abel and colleagues (Abel,
Becker & Cunningham-Rathner, 1984; Abel et al., 1989). Abel et al. (1984) noted that CSOs
often excuse, minimize or justify their sexual assaults (e.g. ‘‘having intercourse with a child is a
good way to achieve closeness’’, p. 100). Using a term that first appeared in Beck’s (1967)
study of depressed patients, Abel et al. (1984) called these statements ‘‘cognitive distortions’’.
Initially, CSOs’ cognitive distortions were described as ‘‘ . . . cognitive beliefs that support
sexual involvement with children’’ (Abel et al., 1984, p. 98). However, the description was
later broadened to include other phenomena such as ‘‘ . . . an individual’s internal processes,
including the justifications, perceptions and judgments used by the sex offender to rationalise
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his child molestation behaviour’’ (Abel et al., 1989, p. 137). In this paper we will use the term
‘‘cognitive distortions’’ to refer to the distorted-sounding statements that CSOs utter or
endorse.
Following publication of Abel’s work, confusion has remained over how cognitive
distortions are best conceptualized. Researchers and clinicians tend to hypothesize that CSOs
who utter distorted-sounding propositions actually believe them to be true. This assumption
is reflected not only in the writings of researchers and theorists (see Gannon & Polaschek,
2006) but also in current CSO assessment and rehabilitation techniques. For instance, when
CSOs indicate greater mean agreement with cognitive distortions on questionnaires than
comparison groups the result is assumed to demonstrate that CSOs hold enduring, abnormal
cognitions. Similarly, conventional treatments focus on challenging CSOs’ ‘‘cognitive
distortions’’ (Beech & Mann, 2002; Mann & Beech, 2003; Mann & Shingler, 2006; Murphy,
1990), seemingly with the rationale that changing CSOs’ distorted-sounding statements will
alter beliefs that shape the way CSOs interpret their social worlds.
In recent years, the idea that cognitive distortions are driven by beliefs has been
developed by Ward into an explanatory framework (Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999).
After analysing cognitive distortions listed in questionnaire and interview studies, Ward and
Keenan surmised that CSOs’ distortions emanate from interlocking belief systems that
cluster*along with associated concepts* into so-called implicit theories (ITs). The nature of
the content stored in these types of schemas leads CSOs to attend to, perceive, process and
remember events in specific, offence-supportive ways. Ward and Keenan identified five ITs in
CSOs: Nature of harm (i.e. beliefs that sexual activity does not necessarily harm children);
Uncontrollability (i.e. beliefs that one’s life and actions cannot be controlled); Dangerous world
(i.e. beliefs that the world is a hostile place requiring aggressive responses); and Entitlement
(i.e. beliefs that one’s needs and wants assume precedence over others’). The fifth IT, Children
as sexual beings, contains beliefs that children can make informed decisions about sex and
legitimately express sexual desires with adults. Unlike other ITs, Children as sexual beings is
hypothesized to be CSO-specific (Ward, Gannon & Keown, 2006). In a qualitative analysis of
CSOs’ interview statements, this IT received the highest level of endorsement, with 21 of 22
participants endorsing it (Marziano, 2002).
The hypothesis that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs certainly has intuitive appeal.
However, evidence supporting the hypothesis comes almost exclusively from interview
and questionnaire studies, where CSOs’ cognitive distortions may reflect a wide range of
phenomena other than underlying beliefs (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006). To illustrate, let us
first consider cognitive distortions uttered during interviews. Maruna and Mann (2006)
observe that, typically, humans frame excuses when explaining their unfavourable behaviour,
and these excuses have the socially adaptive effect of lowering audiences’ negative evaluations.
CSOs who make excuses for their offending may merely be following a widely accepted social
protocol. Such excuses may also serve to reduce CSOs’ sense of guilt for engaging in acts they
themselves do not condone, or they might be accurate descriptions that correctly portray
circumstances CSOs experienced during the offending period.
Questionnaire studies also offer only partial support for the hypothesis that CSOs hold
offence-supportive beliefs that drive cognitive distortions. As Gannon and Polaschek (2006)
point out, even when CSOs’ responses to cognitive distortion questionnaires are more
distorted than controls’*a finding that is by no means consistent (see Gannon, Ward &
Collie, 2007)*it is not because CSOs actually endorse questionnaire items. While they may
not refute items as strongly as controls, CSOs typically demonstrate overall disagreement with
cognitive distortion items (see Arkowitz & Vess, 2003; Bumby, 1996; Feelgood, Cortoni &
Thompson, 2005). This may call into question the idea that differential responding indicates
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that CSOs actively believe questionnaire items to be true. Responses might instead represent
social phenomena. For instance, CSOs might exaggerate item agreement out of concern that
their responses will be treated with scepticism if they disagree too vehemently (Gannon,
2006). Conversely, control groups might tend to respond defensively, exaggerating their
disagreement for fear of being suspected capable of child sexual offending. In summary, then,
interview and questionnaire measures of cognitive distortions cannot be relied upon as
the sole source of evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs.
In cognitive psychology, socially desirable responding has been circumvented via
experimental methods that allow the unobtrusive study of cognition. By measuring changes
in the way that individuals automatically respond to stimuli, cognitive-experimental methods
can reveal information about the beliefs and schemata that influence individuals’ social
processing (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). These implicit methods may help to elucidate
whether CSOs’ cognitive distortions are driven by abnormal beliefs or by alternative
phenomena.
Recently, Gannon, Wright, Beech and Williams (2006) conducted a cognitive experi-
mental study of CSOs. Gannon et al. hypothesized that if CSOs hold offence-supportive
beliefs they should interpret (and therefore recall) offence-relevant material in an offence-
supportive manner. CSOs and offender controls read a vignette describing sexual offending
against a child in which ambiguous statements that could be interpreted in offence-supportive
ways were embedded (e.g. ‘‘Sophie turned over and put her hand on his thigh’’: p. 10).
Statements tapped four of the five ITs identified by Ward and Keenan (1999), including the
Children as sexual beings IT. Against expectations, when participants later completed a surprise
free recall task, no differences existed between the content recalled by CSOs and offender
controls; all participants misremembered the vignette, but not in a way that was offence-
supportive.
More recently, Keown, Gannon and Ward (in press) asked CSOs and offender and non-
offender controls to complete a modified version of a lexical decision task (see Baldwin, Fehr,
Keedian, Seidel & Thomson, 1993; Mikulincer, 1998). Participants read a series of
incomplete sentences, each of which was followed by a real word or non-word letter string.
To illustrate, the incomplete sentence, Having sex with children won’t do them any . . . was
followed by the word harm (offence-supportive word), good (non-offence-supportive word) or
knid (control non-word). Participants indicated*under time pressure*whether completion
words were real words or non-words. It was reasoned that if CSO participants held offence-
supportive beliefs they would be quicker, relative to controls, to respond to offence-supportive
sentence completions. Contrary to predictions, CSOs did not show this overall pattern of
responding. Nor, more specifically, did the expected pattern emerge for the Children as sexual
beings IT.
An interesting explanation for the null results found by Gannon et al. (2006) and Keown
et al. (in press) could be that CSOs’ belief structures were not activated appropriately.
Priming, which involves increasing the accessibility of a mental representation by exposing an
individual to a relevant concept, word or environmental cue (Baldwin, Carrell & Lopez, 1990;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Higgins, 1989), may have been needed to activate their beliefs.
When beliefs are primed they can affect subsequent information processing. For instance,
Baldwin et al. (1990) found that visually priming negative or positive self-beliefs altered the
way students evaluated their own research ideas. Similarly, Murray, Spadafore and McIntosh
(2005) demonstrated that activation of just-world beliefs affected participants’ processing of
rape-related information.
The following study is designed to investigate whether CSOs hold the Children as sexual
beings IT. It contains three successive stages: priming, encoding and recognition. In the
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priming phase, CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs are primed by presenting CSOs and offender
controls (OCs) with images of semi-clothed children. Total time spent viewing such images is
a significant predictor of sexual interest (Abel, Huffman, Warberg & Holland, 1998; Gress,
2005; Harris, Rice, Quinsey & Chaplin, 1996). Thus, if CSOs spend lengthy time periods
looking at the images their belief structures should be activated, leading them to make
sexualized interpretations of children’s actions. The subsequent two stages are adapted from a
design used successfully with violent offenders by Copello and Tata (1990). During the
encoding phase, participants read ambiguous sentences about children that could be
interpreted in a sexualized manner. Participants are then given a surprise recognition task
in which half of the originally sexually ambiguous sentences are now presented with a clear
sexualized interpretation, while the other half are presented with a clear non-sexual
interpretation. To ensure that more general biases towards threatening stimuli do not exist
between groups, ambiguous sentences holding content that could be interpreted in a negative
manner will also be presented during encoding. Disambiguated versions of these ‘‘threat’’
sentences will be presented in the recognition phase.
Our first hypothesis is that viewing time in the child priming condition will be longer for
CSOs than OCs, while viewing time in the adult control condition will be statistically equal
for both participant groups. Our second hypothesis is that, compared to controls, CSOs in the
priming condition will recognize more unambiguously sexualized sentences than benign
sentences. It is also hypothesized that this biased recall for sexualized sentences will be
accompanied by faster responses among primed CSOs, because individuals are faster to
process schema-congruent information (e.g. Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Sharkey & Sharkey,
1987).
Method
Participants
Sixty-four men took part in this study: 27 CSOs and 37 OCs. Participants were recruited
from New Zealand Department of Corrections prisons. Prison managers distributed a
recruitment flyer to prisoners inviting them to take part in ‘‘a reading study’’ and ‘‘an internet
study’’. Flyers stated that participants were wanted who could read the recruitment flyer with
ease.
CSOs were prison inmates whose index offences included at least one sexual conviction
against a person under the age of 16. Their ages ranged from 22 to 77 years [mean45.85,
standard deviation (s.d.)14.61] and their victims’ ages ranged from 2 to 15 years (mean
9.52, s.d.4.33). According to CSOs’ conviction records, 16 were extrafamilial offenders
(i.e. had molested at least one non-relative), while 11 were intrafamilial (i.e. had molested
only biological or non-biological family members). Two extrafamilial and no intrafamilial
CSOs had received cognitivebehavioural therapy to reconstruct distorted offence-related
cognitions. Since receiving therapy, the two treated CSOs had committed at least one sexual
assault against a child. The number of years that CSOs had spent in formal education ranged
from none to 15 years (mean10.26, s.d.1.56). Five CSOs identified themselves as Maori,
15 as European and seven as ‘‘other’’.
OCs were men who were serving a prison sentence, but who had never been convicted of
a sexual offence against a person under the age of 16. OCs were aged from 20 to 69 years
(mean34.16, s.d.9.63). Conviction records showed that six OCs had been convicted at
some time for a sexual offence against a person over the age of 16. The number of years that
OC participants had spent in formal education ranged from 9 to 12 years (mean10.00,
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s.d.1.05). Seventeen OCs identified themselves as Maori, 16 as European and five as
‘‘other’’.
Comparison of offender groups
Independent-sample t-tests revealed the two offender groups did not differ significantly on
number of years spent in education or length of prison sentence. A x2 test for independence
confirmed that between-group differences approached significance for ethnicity, x2(2, n64)
5.98, p0.05, Cramer’s V0.306. CSOs and OCs differed significantly on age, t(62)3.86,
pB0.001, with CSOs having a higher mean age (mean45.85, s.d.14.61) than OCs
(mean34.16, s.d.9.63).
Comparison of participant groups
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were run to determine whether differences existed across the
four participant groups (i.e. primed and control CSOs and OCs). The four groups did
not differ significantly on number of years spent in education and length of prison sentence,
and a x2 test for independence confirmed that between-group differences did not exist for
ethnicity. However, the groups were found to differ significantly in age, F(3,60)7.23,
pB0.001. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that primed CSOs were significantly older
(mean51.91, s.d.11.53) than control CSOs (mean41.00, s.d.15.34), primed OCs
(mean34.30, s.d.8.39) and control OCs (mean34.00, s.d.11.19). An independent-
samples t-test confirmed that CSOs did not differ in their Static-99 scores across the two
conditions. Characteristics of the four participant groups are displayed in Table I.
Design
There were three experimental phases: priming, encoding and recognition, as follows.
. Priming: half the CSOs and OCs viewed pictures of semi-clothed children twice. The
other half viewed pictures of clothed adults twice. Pictures were presented twice to
ensure adequate exposure. Participants were told the aim of this task was to judge the
age of the depicted subjects.
. Encoding: participants viewed 20 ambiguous and 10 filler sentences.
. Recognition: participants viewed 50 sentences similar to those viewed during encoding
and indicated whether they recognized each sentence.
A mixed-subjects design was used. Independent between-subjects variables were group
(CSOs versus OCs) and condition (priming versus control). Dependent variables were
response time (RT) to priming pictures, comparative recognition scores for recognition
sentences and response time to recognition sentences.
Materials
Priming phase pictures
Child pictures (priming condition). These were selected from computer-generated images
(available commercially from Pacific Psychological Assessment Corporation, 2004). They
were constructed via computer morphing technology designed for use in studies of sexual
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arousal to children. Females were depicted wearing swimming costumes; males wore boxer
shorts. Twenty images were presented, comprised of five images from each of four categories:
females and males aged approximately nine and 13 years old.
Adult pictures (control condition). These were photographs chosen from the International
Affective Picture System (1999). Ten females and 10 males judged to be middle-aged or older
were depicted fully clothed. These pictures were deemed highly unlikely to arouse sexual
interest and thus should not have primed cognitive structures relating to children or sex. It
should be noted here that qualitative differences existed between the stark, computer-
generated images of children (who, unlike adults, were depicted against a blank background)
and the more vivid photographs of adults.
Encoding sentences. Twenty ambiguous and 10 neutral ‘‘filler’’ sentences were used (all
sentences are available from authors on request). Ten ambiguous sentences could be
interpreted in a sexual or non-sexual way; these were our target stimuli (e.g. ‘‘The coach
told 10-year-old Jo to stop teasing him’’). These ‘‘sexual’’ sentences were designed to tap
beliefs that children are sexual beings. In addition, 10 control sentences were presented that
could be interpreted in a threatening or non-threatening way (e.g. ‘‘The doctor frowned as he
Table I. Demographic details for participant groups.
Child sex offenders Offender controls
Child prime
n12
Adult prime
n15
Child prime
n20
Adult prime
n17
Age (years)
Mean 51.92 41.00 34.30 34.00***
SD 11.53 15.34 8.39 11.19
Years in education
Mean 10.08 10.40 9.90 10.12
SD 1.83 1.35 0.97 1.17
Reading time (ms)
Mean 3476.77 4055.11 3092.29 3553.09
SD 2349.74 3584.54 1332.25 3115.36
Sentence (years)
Mean 8.94 7.93 5.74 6.44
SD 4.03 4.80 2.75 4.65
CSO type (n)
Intra 5.0 6.0  
Extrafamilial 10.0 6.0  
Child vicitms (n)
Mean 3.00 3.07  
SD 2.95 2.71  
Victim age (years)
Mean 10.13 11.47  
SD 3.97 3.37  
STATlC-99 score
Mean 2.67 3.00
SD 2.02 2.48
*pB.05, **pB.01, ***pB.001.
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measured little Sarah’s growth’’). These sentences were based on sentences used by Copello
and Tata (1990) and were presented to monitor whether group differences in responding
reflected general negative biases. The 10 remaining filler sentences were not ambiguous (e.g.
‘‘The two old friends played pool until closing time’’). They were added to the task to conceal
experiment aims and to monitor participant responding.
Recognition sentences. The 50 recognition sentences were similar in wording and content to
encoding sentences. Ten filler recognition sentences had identical meanings to the 10 filler
sentences presented at encoding but contained minor word changes (e.g. ‘‘The two friends
played pool until the pub closed’’). Of the 40 unambiguous recognition sentences, 10
presented a non-sexual interpretation of encoding sentences (e.g. ‘‘The coach told 10-year-
old Jo to stop being cheeky with him’’), 10 presented a sexual interpretation (e.g. ‘‘The coach
told 10-year-old Jo to stop being flirty with him’’), 10 presented a non-threatening
interpretation (e.g. ‘‘The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s height’’) and 10
presented a threatening interpretation (e.g. ‘‘The doctor frowned as he measured little Sarah’s
cancer’’). Relevant encoding and recognition sentences were matched and balanced in
complexity (i.e. Flesch Reading Ease score) and length.
Apparatus
All tasks were programmed using a Superlab package and run on a 12-inch colour monitor
screen from a Dell Pentium Latitude D600 laptop computer. Written instructions and stimuli
were centred on a white screen in bold black Times New Roman text. Participants made their
responses on a Cedrus Model RB-730 response pad. In the age judging task, labels were
placed over keys on the response pad reading ‘‘under 16’’ and ‘‘over 16’’ in the priming
condition and ‘‘under 75’’ and ‘‘over 75’’ in the control condition. These were replaced with
labels reading ‘‘recall’’ and ‘‘don’t recall’’ during the recognition phase. Placement of labels
was alternated across participants to eliminate handedness effects.
Superlab controlled the random presentation of pictures in the age-judging task, and
recorded the time that elapsed between each button press made to indicate an age judgement.
Superlab also controlled the random presentation of encoding and recognition sentences, and
recorded type of response made (recall/don’t recall) and response time (RT) to recognition
sentences.
Procedure
Priming phase. After giving written consent, participants supplied demographic information
about themselves (e.g. age and ethnicity). Participants allocated randomly into the priming
condition were told that on first presentation of the child pictures they should simply
familiarize themselves with the pictures, and on second presentation they should indicate
whether the person in the picture was over or under the age of 16. They were advised to spend
as long as they wanted looking at each picture. To disguise task aims, priming participants
were told that the study was looking at trends in the use of internet pornography and that a
research aim was to establish whether adult men can deduce age accurately in young people.
Control participants were told that they were to view two sets of images of mature adults
and indicate during the second set whether the depicted subjects were over or under 75 years
of age. Control participants were told the study aimed to investigate modern-day age
perceptions.
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Before the age-judging task all participants completed a practice run. To create a sense of
privacy a large screen was placed around the computer, blocking it from the experimenter’s
view.
Encoding phase. Participants were asked to take part in ‘‘a reading study’’. They were
instructed to read sentences*taking as long as needed*about which they would later be
asked questions. Participants read 30 sentences presented serially and in random order. Upon
reading each sentence participants pressed a button on the response pad to view the next
sentence.
Recognition phase. Participants completed a surprise ‘‘memory test’’. They were presented with
30 recognition sentences: 10 reformulations of filler sentences, 10 unambiguous versions of
threat sentences (i.e. five threatening and five non-threatening) and 10 unambiguous versions
of sexual sentences (i.e. five sexual and five non-sexual). As each sentence appeared
participants indicated whether they had seen that sentence (or one with the same meaning)
during the encoding phase.
Results
Analyses were conducted to explore the hypotheses that: (1) during the priming phase,
primed CSOs will display longer viewing times for children than OCs or control CSOs; (2)
during the recognition phase, primed CSOs will remember more sexual than non-sexual
recognition sentences; and (3) this biased recall for sexual recognition sentences by primed
CSOs will be accompanied by faster responses relative to other groups.
Data preparation: response times
Two sets of RT data were of interest in our analysis: (1) time taken to indicate age judgements
for pictures during the priming phase; and (2) time taken to indicate sentence recollection
during the recognition phase.
As noted by Ratcliff (1993), RT data need to be transformed such that the effects of
outliers on ANOVAs are minimized. RT data typically contain extreme responses that do not
represent the intended cognitive mechanisms (e.g. extremely small RTs may indicate
unintentional responses, while extremely large RTs might represent attentional drift). In
line with previous research (e.g. Holden, Kroner, Fekken & Popham, 1992; Ratcliffe, 1993;
Welford, 1980) both sets of RT data [i.e. (1) and (2)] were Windsorized to adjust for outliers
(Barnett & Lewis, 1978) (i.e. RTs more than two standard deviations above the group mean
were replaced with the highest RT within two standard deviations of the group mean; RTs
more than two standard deviations below the group mean were replaced with the lowest RT
within two standard deviations of the group mean). This ensured inclusion of all RTs in the
data set while minimizing the impact of potentially spurious responses.
For RT data set (2), mean RTs to unambiguous non-threatening sentences were
subtracted from mean RTs to unambiguous threatening sentences to create a mean threat RT
score for each participant. Similarly, mean RTs to unambiguous non-sexual sentences were
subtracted from mean RTs to unambiguous sexual sentences to create a mean sexual RT score
for each participant. This procedure clarified each participant’s overall pattern of responding
to threat and sexual sentences. A positive mean threat RT score would indicate that a
participant was faster to recognize threatening sentences relative to non-threatening
152 K. Keown et al.
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sentences, while a positive mean sexual RT score would indicate that a participant was faster
to recognize sexual sentences relative to non-sexual sentences.
Data preparation: recognition analysis
Sentences presented in the recognition phase were grouped according to the following five
categories: filler, non-threatening, threatening, non-sexual and sexual. Recognition scores for
each category were calculated so that possible scores ranged from zero (no sentences
recognized) to five (all sentences recognized). Next, mean recognition scores for unambig-
uous non-threatening sentences were subtracted from mean recognition scores for unambig-
uous threatening sentences to create a mean threat recognition score for each participant.
Similarly, mean recognition scores for unambiguous non-sexual sentences were subtracted
from mean recognition scores for unambiguous sexual sentences to create a mean sexual
recognition score for each participant. This procedure clarified each participant’s overall pattern
of responding to threat and sexual sentences. A positive mean threat recognition score would
indicate that a participant had recognized more threatening than non-threatening sentences,
while a mean sexual recognition score would indicate that a participant had recognized more
sexual than non-sexual sentences.
Main analysis of picture viewing times
To determine whether viewing time during the age judging task differed between the two
offender groups (CSO versus OC) according to the type of picture presented (priming versus
control), two independent-samples t-tests were conducted. The first t-test compared the
length of time that CSOs and OCs looked at control pictures. As expected, no significant
difference in looking times was found between the two groups t(30)0.08, p0.934. The
second t-test compared the length of time that CSOs and OCs looked at priming pictures.
Here a significant difference was found between CSOs’ and OCs’ looking times, t(30)2.44,
p0.021, h20.166, with CSOs viewing the child pictures considerably longer (mean
1787.08, s.d.871.81) than OCs (mean1200.97, s.d.492.21). Thus, CSOs displayed
longer viewing times than OCs in the priming condition only.
Main analysis of sentence recognition
Before exploring whether primed CSOs recognized more sexual sentences than other
participant groups, participants’ recognition scores for filler sentences were compared to
ensure that recognition levels did not differ. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to determine
whether experimental condition (priming versus control) affected offender groups differen-
tially (CSO versus OC) in terms of the number of filler sentences they recognized. The
independent variables were offender group (CSO and OC) and condition (priming and
control). The dependent variable was mean filler sentence recognition. There was no main
effect of group, F(1,60)1.55, p0.218 nor condition, F(1,60)2.36, p0.130. As expected,
no significant interaction between offender group and condition emerged, illustrating that
there did not appear to be a difference in the number of times that primed and control CSOs
and OCs said they recognized filler sentences, F(1,60)2.99, p0.586, h20.005.
Participants’ mean threat recognition scores were also analysed to ensure that general
recognition biases for threatening sentences did not exist. The above two-way ANOVA was
repeated with mean threat recognition scores as the dependent variable. There was no main
effect of group, F(1,60)0.16, p0.695 nor condition, F(1,60)0.08, p0.773. No
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significant interaction between offender group and condition emerged, illustrating that there
did not appear to be a difference in the mean threat recognition scores of primed or unprimed
CSOs or OCs, F(1,60)2.94, p0.092, h20.047. In other words, as expected, the four
groups did not differ in their relative recognition of non-threatening and threatening
sentences.
Having confirmed that none of the participant groups differed in their recognition of filler
and threat control sentences, we turn to the crucial question of whether primed CSOs showed
a recognition bias for unambiguous sexual sentences.
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether experimental condition
(priming versus control) affected our offender groups differentially (CSO versus OC) in
terms of the types of unambiguously sexual/non-sexual sentences they recognized. The
independent variables were offender group (CSO and OC) and condition (priming and
control). The dependent variable was mean sexual recognition score. There was no main
effect of group, F(1,60)0.75, p0.391 nor condition, F(1,60)1.01, p0.947. Also,
contrary to our predictions, no significant interaction between offender group and condition
emerged, F(1,60)2.53, p0.117, h20.041, illustrating that there did not appear to be a
difference in participants’ recognition of unambiguously sexual and non-sexual sentences (see
Figure 1). Bonferroni post-hoc tests were conducted to examine whether the mean sexual
recognition scores for any participant group differed from those of any other participant
group. No significant differences were found. Thus, contrary to expectations, neither primed
nor control CSOs had more positive mean sexual recognition scores than either primed or
control OCs. To investigate whether response differences existed between higher deviancy
versus lower deviancy CSOs the above two-way ANOVA was rerun with STATIC-99 scores
added as a covariate. The pattern of results was unchanged; no significant differences were
found. Also, to check that the above findings were unaffected by the fact that six OC
participants had sexually offended against adults, the above ANOVA was rerun with their data
removed from the analysis. Again, the results pattern was unchanged.
Finally, because CSOs were significantly older than OCs, all two-way ANOVAs described
above were rerun with age as a covariate. The main pattern of results remained the same (i.e.
no significant interactions emerged).
If primed CSOs had recognized more sexual than non-sexual sentences compared to
other groups, this would indicate that they had a processing bias towards sexual sentences and
so should produce faster response speeds to sexual sentences. However, as the above analyses
did not reveal such a processing bias in primed CSOs, they should not be faster to make
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FIGURE 1. Mean recognition differences (9standard error of the mean) for sexual recognition sentences.
154 K. Keown et al.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
59
 1
6 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
decisions about sexual sentences versus non-sexual sentences compared to OCs and control
CSOs. In the following section this claim is investigated.
To ensure first that CSOs and OCs in the priming and control conditions did not differ in
their baseline sentence processing speed, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to determine
whether experimental condition (priming versus control) affected offender groups differen-
tially in their RTs to filler sentences. The independent variables were offender group (CSO
and OC) and condition (priming and control). The dependent variable was mean filler
sentence RT. There was no main effect of group, F(1,60)1.48, p0.229 nor condition,
F(1,60)0.22, p0.639. No significant differences existed in RTs to filler sentences between
primed and control across the two conditions, F(1,60).824, p0.368, h20.014.
In order to investigate response times to sexual sentences we were interested in the
relative rates of responding to unambiguously sexual and non-sexual sentences. The above
two-way ANOVA was repeated, this time using mean sexual RT score as the dependent
variable. Main effects were not found for group, F(1,60)0.67, p0.417 nor condition,
F(1,60)1.21, p0.275. In addition, a groupcondition interaction was not found, F(1,60)
0.49, p0.488, h20.008, indicating that primed CSOs were no quicker than other
participant groups to respond to unambiguous sexual sentences relative to non-sexual
sentences. To check that the above results were not affected by the fact that six OC
participants had sexually offended against adults, the above ANOVA was rerun with these six
OCs removed from the analysis. Again, the pattern of results remained unchanged. Also, all
the above RT ANOVAs were rerun with age as a covariate. No significant interactions
emerged.
Discussion
In line with the first of our hypotheses, CSOs and OCs viewed images of clothed adults for
equivalent lengths of time, while CSOs viewed images of semi-clothed children longer than
did OCs. This finding accords with studies in which CSOs have shown longer viewing
latencies than comparison groups for clothed or unclothed images of children (e.g. Abel et al.,
2004; Harris et al., 1996). Because viewing time is a reliable measure of sexual interest (e.g.
Abel et al., 1998, 2004; Gress, 2005; Harris et al., 1996), CSOs’ protracted priming picture
viewing times appear to indicate that CSOs in this study experienced sexual interest when
exposed to images of children. This suggests the priming stimuli simulated cues often
encountered by CSOs during the offence process and presumably activated beliefs linking
children and sex.
Our second hypothesis was that CSOs in the priming condition would demonstrate
preferential recognition for unambiguously sexual sentences. Interestingly, primed and
control CSOs and OCs showed no difference in recognition levels for, or response times
to, any sentence type. While it comes as no surprise that CSOs did not differ from controls in
the way that they remembered filler and threat control sentences, it was expected that primed
CSOs would interpret ambiguously sexual sentences in line with beliefs that children are
sexual beings and hence show greater recognition for sexualized sentences than controls. In
short, the CSOs in this study did not show evidence of holding these types of beliefs, even
when exposed to a relevant prime.
Results were similar to those found within two other cognitiveexperimental studies.
Recall that Gannon et al. (2006) embedded ambiguous sentences in a vignette describing
events surrounding the sexual abuse of a child. CSOs showed no evidence of having
interpreted originally key sentences in line with sexual offence-supportive beliefs, including
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Children as sexual beings beliefs. Similarly, Keown et al. (in press) were unable to find evidence
that CSOs held Children as sexual beings beliefs in their lexical decision task study, despite the
fact that participants in the study had virtually no opportunity to censure their responses.
Sentences used in the current study focused solely upon beliefs contained within the
Children as sexual beings IT. Of the five ITs identified by Ward and Keenan this IT has been
found to be the most prevalent among CSOs (Marziano, Ward, Beech & Pattison, 2006), and
is the one represented most widely in commonly used cognitive distortion questionnaires
(Gannon, Keown & Rose, in press). It is therefore surprising that evidence of this belief type
did not emerge in this study or in those conducted by Gannon et al. (2006) and Keown et al.
(in press).
It is possible that CSOs in this study behaved defensively by deliberately claiming not to
recall familiar-looking sexualized sentences. However, research suggests that when individuals
‘‘fake good’’ on similar tasks their responses are faster (see Gannon & Polaschek, 2005).
Participant groups in the current study could not be distinguished according to their response
times to any particular class of sentence, seeming to indicate that no group deliberately
manipulated responses.
Another possible limitation is that the experimental task given to participants was too far
removed from real-life situations to reveal information-processing biases. Clearly, reading
brief sentences about children is not equivalent to interpreting the complex social data
available in real-life interactions with children. In future research more realistic test stimuli
could be created, for instance, in the form of videos depicting interactions between adults and
children, or computer programs that allow conversations with mock children.
Another limitation concerns our small CSO participant sample. Although interactions
concerning sexual sentences did not even approach significance, obtaining a larger sample of
CSOs would have increased statistical power. In fact, the results depicted in Figure 1 indicate
that not only were differences between experimental groups non-significant, but primed OCs
actually said they recognized a greater ratio of sexual sentences than primed CSOs (even
though OCs had shown no signs of sexual interest in the child pictures). This raises the
possibility that viewing child pictures somehow affected offender controls’ perceptions of
sentences describing children’s actions (e.g. the pictures may have triggered beliefs that
children can behave manipulatively or place one in danger).
A final limitation concerns the differences that existed between adult and child pictures
presented to participants. Because child pictures were computer-generated they looked less
lifelike and vivid than adult photographs. Also, children were depicted against blank
backgrounds, whereas adults were depicted against more interesting backgrounds, such as
in a field. These differences prevented clean comparisons between child and adult picture
viewing times. While the main aim of picture presentation was to expose some participants to
images of scantily clothed children (and even though CSOs showed a clear tendency to view
child pictures longer than did OCs), this study would have been improved by the use of more
comparable child/adult images.
In summary, it is possible that the null results found in this study are attributable to
experimental design flaws, or to the fact that the experimental manipulation was not sensitive
enough to detect differences between groups. Alternatively, CSOs in the current study may
not have held beliefs that paint children as sexual beings. Future research should continue to
use cognitiveexperimental techniques to study this important question. It is vital that
psychologists understand whether the current lack of experimental evidence for CSO-specific
beliefs reflects the fact that such beliefs are less widespread than thought currently, or the need
for researchers to refine their experimental techniques and develop more sophisticated ways of
applying them. Studies are needed that explore in greater depth the effects of alternative
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primes (e.g. emotion, mood and sexual arousal manipulations) on information processing in
CSOs and that present experimental stimuli that imitate situations experienced more
accurately by CSOs in their day-to-day lives.
Of equal importance is that social scientists remain open-minded regarding the theory
that CSOs typically hold offence-supportive beliefs. The current authors hold no illusions as
to the attractiveness of this theory; like many colleagues we have found that when we ask
CSOs to explain their offences they sound so distorted it is hard to imagine that they do not
hold faulty belief systems. However, it is important that social scientists do not simply accept
theories at face value and instead consider a balanced range of empirical evidence.
The current study may have implications for the way in which CSOs are rehabilitated; if
faulty beliefs are not held universally by CSOs it follows that rehabilitation programmes
should tailor treatment approaches for CSOs for whom faulty beliefs play little or no role in
their offending. As Kirsch and Becker (2005) have pointed out, sexual offender rehabilitation
is typically group-based, with all participants receiving the same cognitive interventions. The
authors suggest that one way of improving treatment effectiveness could be to target only
those factors relevant to intervention. In light of the current findings, this may mean reducing
the time devoted to restructuring some CSOs’ distorted cognitions, and increasing the time
spent identifying other causative factors.
Another implication of our findings is that they raise doubts about the notion that CSOs’
cognitive distortions are driven primarily by faulty beliefs. As discussed, theorists, researchers
and clinicians have frequently adopted a stance that essentially equates cognitive distortions
with beliefs. Because CSOs commonly articulate or endorse cognitive distortions, this stance
has culminated in a widespread perception that the vast majority of CSOs hold beliefs that
facilitate their offending. Yet, as discussed, additional mechanisms may underlie cognitive
distortions (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Mann, 2006, Ward, Gannon, & Keown,
2006). Hence, research into alternative drivers of cognitive distortions would be valuable.
Measuring cognitive distortions under different personal and interpersonal situations may
reveal processes*both internal and external to the offender* that influence generation of
distorted-sounding propositions among CSOs.
In conclusion, this paper has adopted a cognitiveexperimental approach to the study of
CSOs’ offence-supportive beliefs. Contrary to expectations, findings did not support the
claim that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs that lead them to interpret children’s actions
in sexualized ways. The disjunction between results in the current study and findings from
questionnaire and interview studies underscores the need for multiple approaches when
seeking understanding of CSOs’ beliefs. The results and ensuing discussion in this study have
also highlighted the need for further research into the phenomena that generate ‘‘cognitive
distortions’’. Through the open-minded pursuit of these lines of enquiry, researchers can
continue to contribute to a reduction in the harm that is inflicted at the hands of sexual
offenders.
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